Objection three: The inclusion of narcotics related crimes would overwhelm the Court.
The 1996 Preparatory Committee, for what became the Rome Statute, declared that drug trafficking was:
… of such a quantity as to flood the court; the court would not have the necessary resources to conduct the lengthy and complex investigations required to prosecute the crimes…. international character. 23 Furthermore, the Court is bounded by the concept of complementarily: it will only take cases which national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute. 24 In this regard, the ICC may be of use as a catalyst by coercing or directing national courts to prosecute major traffickers.
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The threshold issue may be best illustrated by a brief viewing of the list of traffickers extradited from Afghanistan to America. America does not extradite drug mules carrying a couple of grams of heroin, nor would the Court. The last three major traffickers to be extradited by America have all been linked to the insurgency or managed the trafficking of large quantities of illicit drugs over a number of years. 26 In short, the threshold for Court involvement would be set at those with the greatest responsibility for the illicit trade.
Objection four: The definition of narcotics related crimes was too vague.
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Potential effects

Effects: Immunity
A key aim of the Court is to limit immunity from prosecution. 57 Immunity may result from intimidation, institutional ineffectiveness or, an unwillingness/inability to arrest or prosecute. 58 As such, it is unsurprising that many Afghan traffickers enjoy immunity. Whilst renovation of the prison system is ongoing, it has been fraught with difficulties and continues to exhibit significant security weaknesses, 67 including cases of convicted traffickers being freed after paying bribes 68 and the escape of 500 prisoners from Kandahar prison in May 2011. 69 In terms of law enforcement, if used effectively the Court would be able to collate evidence from a number of domestic and foreign jurisdictions, 70 including Interpol. Allowing the prosecution to build a stronger case than it would by relying on evidence collected from just one or two jurisdictions.
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Much of the aforementioned positives are somewhat symbolic. They will communicate to the Afghan people that: the state is unwilling to tolerate traffickers, none are immune from the law, all are equal before the law and the state has the capabilities to arrest and prosecute powerful offenders. If communicated effectively this symbolism may go some way to improving the low-levels of trust the Afghan peoples have in the Afghan criminal justice system. Illustrating the ability to bring powerful offenders to justice would additionally undermine one of the Taliban's main selling points: that it can provide quick, harsh and 'fair' justice.
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The symbolism argument could, however, be reversed. While it may illustrate that the state is willing to enforce the law, it may conversely demonstrate the inherent weaknesses in the countries infant criminal justice system. The astute Afghan may read the involvement of the ICC for what it is: a response to the corruption, inefficiency and immunity inherent in a criminal justice system which protects the powerful.
Effects: Deterrence
In parallel to the aim of ending immunity the Court endeavours to provide a preventive function. 73 This section shall review the crime prevention and drug control literature to provide an indication of whether the ICC could deter trafficking.
The primary objective of drug law enforcement is to increase risks, as increased risks translate into increased cost. As these costs are passed on to the consumer through inflated prices a barrier is erected which prevents would-be consumers, whilst compelling current consumers into treatment. The Courts objective would, therefore, be to increase the perceived risk of trafficking.
While much American, British and Canadian research into drug trafficking supports the deterrence effect of increased probability of arrest, studies tend to suggest that few traffickers perceive there to be much risk. 74 There may be hierarchal groups operating within larger networks. In some networks a solid inner core subcontracts work to small cells. While the cells change, the core group is more permanent. 88 Such networks have been referred to as 'wheel networks'. The so-called Columbian cocaine trafficking 'cartels', for example, were structured with a core group at the centre which exerted significant authority over independent sub-contracted cells. As the leaders of the two major networks were killed or imprisoned between 1989 and 1996 subcontracted cells started to branch out, developing more loosely linked and fluid network, described as 'chain networks'. 89 enforcement penetrates their defences. If one cell is penetrated then the core can often call upon another cell to take its place. 90 This does not suggest that the leaders of hierarchal organisation are not insulated: lower employees, including intermediaries and managers, often act as a buffer against law enforcement. 91 The effect on hierarchal organisations may, however, be more significant and restructuring may be costlier. This said, any restructuring will incur costs. 92 Research on the structure Afghan drugs market is scant. Felbab-Brown suggests that approximately 20 trafficking organisations operate within the country 'coalescing around important powerbrokers, both with and without links to the government'. 93 It appears that this small number of core groups sub-contract distribution to independent traffickers (including insurgent groups) and pay for the compliance of local power-holders (i.e. warlords, tribal leaders and state employees). 94 This would suggest that Afghan opiate trafficking bear's closest resemblance to the wheel-network.
If Afghan trafficking organisations have wheel structures then the removal of high-ranking managers may have a significant effect. Following the experience of Columbia it is possible that there will be a short-term dip in production whilst the market adapts; possible by altering the structure closer to a chain-network. 95 Conversely, if smaller organisations are targeted, then this may assist larger traffickers to increase their market share. As larger traffickers are often connected to warlords and insurgents, the result would likely be increased revenue for anti-government parties. 96 Therefore, the option with the least significant unintended consequences, and highest payoff in terms of increasing risk, might involve targeting major traffickers, especially those connected to anti-government actors. Negotiations with competitors who pose less of a threat to the national security may be necessary.
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In summary, law enforcement interventions in Afghanistan are significantly more complex, subtle and politically centred than building a case and arresting the bad guy. Such a strategy may even be counterproductive due to some traffickers' military and political power, geographical and political isolation, and the weakness of the Afghan criminal justice system.
Rather, the state must work from the ground up by destroying the foundation upon which the trafficker's power is built upon.
Should we negotiate?
An issue raised by Barnet Ruben and Jake Sherman is whether to negotiate with traffickers. 
Conclusion
This article began by illustrating the weaknesses of the legal objections against prosecuting narcotics trafficking under the jurisdiction of the ICC. The article then used the case study of Afghanistan to investigate the potential effect that inclusion would have upon a country at the heart of the international illicit opiate trade.
It is suggested that there is potential for the Court to have a significant positive effect on Afghanistan in a number of ways. The strongest arguments are that inclusion would limit immunity from prosecution, make it more difficult to intimidate the judiciary, reduce the potential for escape after sentencing and provide much needed leverage in negotiations with traffickers. Better international cooperation may also make intelligence collection more effective. This may free the overstretched Afghan criminal justice system to concentrate on crimes of greater concern to the Afghan people. may be the utility of the Court in reducing the ability of traffickers to hide themselves or their money outside of Afghanistan.
The Court would need to be aware that the effect of its actions will depend on the structure of the Afghan drugs markets. Possessing a hierarchal or wheel-network structure means that a number of high-level arrests would likely significantly increase the price of Afghan opiates.
The Court will then need to adapt its strategy in response to market reorganisation. In summary, the Court has the potential to either positively or negatively influence
Afghanistan depending upon the discretion and priorities of the Courts prosecutors. This said, the primary objective in Afghanistan must be the formation of an effective criminal justice system. If foreign resources were displaced from the development of the Afghan criminal justice system into the ICC budget then it would become a burden; for there is greater utility in developing an effective Afghan criminal justice system than arresting a few major traffickers. If, however, the Court worked with the Afghan police and judiciary to improve their capabilities whilst freeing their resources for more traditional policing then the Court would likely be a great asset to the peoples of Afghanistan.
